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Shiite Patterns of Post-Migration in Europe  
[Author]
1 
Abstract This brief reflection treats the reactive relation between the dispersions 
of (post-)migration and the integralism of religion in selected cases of European 
Shiism. It reconsiders reports on Twelver Shiism and Shiite Muslims in Europe in 
order to discern the main institutional and demographic tendencies in Shiites’ 
European settlement history in Britain, France, and Germany, and to explore such 
settlement in light of mega-theorizations of European Islam that juxtapose 
‘integration’ and ‘separation’. The presentation focuses on Iranians in Britain and 
argues for the centrality of two complicating variations on the pattern: 
Integration-Retention (as in the case of blood donation practice) and Separation-
Appropriation (as in the case of reformist Islamism in the Ettehādiye Society). 
Each type stems from heightened Self-Other reflection, triggered by migration 
and defined more precisely in terms of boundary setting. Such thought is double-
scaled for differentiation (d) and reciprocation (r), contrasting jurisprudential 
treatments ‘there’ (+d/-r) and organizational engagement ‘here’ (-d/+r). Identity 
formation in European Shiism often involves the rebalancing of these elements. 
 





In the European encounters of Shiite Islam, two sets of social forces have gnawed 
at its lived creeds. The first of these is the diversity of settlement trajectories in 
various Western European countries, with distinct organizational patterns, state 
relations, population build-ups and institutional concentrations. In a profounder 
sense, the status quo ante of Shiite communities has been challenged by 
secularism, cultural liberalism and individualism enshrined by law. The way that 
the newly emerging field of studies on Shiism in Europe has made its object is 
perhaps consistent with this context of formation defined by systemic diffusions. 
That is to say, studies of Shiism in Europe have tended to compartmentalize their 
object and, de facto, autonomize the parts. Following from the prescriptive 
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preoccupations of the contemporary human sciences, their subsidiary studies 
organize around lateral, cross-sectional and secular themes such as generation and 
authority, ritual and emotion, or gender and occupation. While often valuable, 
these contributions barely venture to interrogate the substance of ‘European 
Shiism’ – in unifying understandings, in other words, whether with reference to, 
for instance, intra-sect clerical bridging, cross-ethnic lay networks, interlocking 
organizations or pivotal discursive threads. Should ‘European Shiism’ be 
conceived of as a residual category, then, or as a signifier only ‘floating’ (Lévi-
Strauss 1950:XLIX) over the centreless multiplicity of Europeanized Shiite life? 
In order to explore these questions, or rather to build a case for their negation, 
this article starts with a brief overview of the main institutional and demographic 
tendencies in Shiites’ European settlement history in Britain, France, and 
Germany. The article proceeds with selected assessments of Shiite post-migration, 
following the classic divide in migration studies between international migration 
on the one hand and migrants’ incorporation on the other (Castles & Miller 
2009:20ff.). These case-studies aim to help lay bare some of the elementary 
templates for self and other relations, above and beyond the local particularities of 
settlement context, in Shiites’ engagement with Europe. They help substantiate a 
different conception of Twelverism in Europe, broadly rooted in the Dumontian 
structuralist perspective, i.e., as an integrative tradition which itself is generative 
of social meanings and facts (e.g., see Rio & Smedal 2008; Dumont (1966) 1980). 
The two post-migration patterns to be elaborated below borrow their 
elementary terminology of integration-separation from Berry’s immigrant 
acculturation model (1997), but are divided further into sub-types in Wimmer’s 
classification of rudimentary (ethnic) boundary making (2008). The sub-typing 
has its rationale in the avoidance of hierarchical phrasing in the modeling of 
integration and separation, while ranking questions central to the selected 
boundary settings are significantly reflected in the Shiite-European acculturation 
here studied. The first pattern concerns balances of social integration and 
religious retention. In other words, seemingly opposed tendencies, which, 
however, may also go together in stable patterns (and correspond, for instance, 
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with ‘collective re-positioning’ within a hierarchy). The so-called ‘blood drives’ 
organized transnationally by young Shiites provide an eye-catching example. The 
second tendency shows the near mirror image of integration-retention: how even 
in organizations with an outlook geared overall towards separation, the local 
context may still impact on religious identity through its appropriation. The 
evolution of an Iranian Islamist student organization named the Ettehādiye, active 
across Western Europe in particular, is explored to illustrate this pattern (which 
corresponds with the boundary taxonomy’s ‘normative inversion’ of a hierarchical 
order). The caveat applies to this portrayal that it gravitates towards Britain-based 
and Iranian examples, even while signifying the larger European-Shiite situation.  
The last part of the text reflects on identity formation through hierarchization in 
all sketched cases of boundary modification. The threefold task is to identify 
situations from which such hierarchization springs, to explore its scaling along the 
two axes of differentiation and reciprocation, and within that framework, to 
generalise on socio-religious roles involved in the formation of European Shiism. 
 
The dispersions of settlement 
 
The Twelver Shiite presence in (Western) Europe is recent and stories of Shiite 
settlement before the Second World War are typically of individuals. Among 
these were Iranian envoys between 1811 and 1819 of the modernizing Qājār 
crown prince ᶜAbbās Mirzā (Green 2015), who are likely to have been Twelvers,
3
 
but whose sectarian backgrounds remain unreported, and South Asian students to 
Britain in the late nineteenth century (Shubbar 2006; Ansari 2004:31-32). In the 
early twentieth century, notable Shiite settlers have included the Iranian 
intellectuals Mohammad ᶜAli Jamālzāde (d.1997) and Hoseyn Kāzemzāde 
Irānshahr (d.1962). They lived extensively in France and Switzerland and 
published their respectively iconoclastic and reformist key works (the Yeki bud 
yeki nabud short stories collection and Irānshahr journal) in interbellum Berlin.  
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Three developments since - institutionalization, mass migration and religious 
dissemination - have affected Shiism’s larger European story. Landmark 
institutions have included the Imam Ali (Emām ᶜAli) Mosque of Hamburg, 
originating in 1953 from a building society of local Iranian traders  in consultation 
with their religious guide or ‘Source of Emulation’ (marjaᶜ al-taqlid), the Grand 
Āyatollāh Hoseyn Borujerdi. The foremost Britain-based organizations, as shown 
below, had similarly transnational religious embeddings. The particularizing 
effects of mass immigration are seen, for instance, in the association of Shiism’s 
advent in the Netherlands with Turkish labour migrants in the 1960s and Pakistani 
or Indian migrants seeking either work or political refuge (Shubbar 2006). In the 
1970s, Shiite seminary (hawza/howze) graduates from the Islamic heartlands 
started missionary work in Europe, thought to have expanded in the 1980s (see 
Sindawi 2007:846). But the main demographic and institutional figurations of 
Shiite life in Europe emerge only from the late twentieth century, and from 
country specifics - sketched here for the British, French and German settlements.  
As the most globalised European country, Great Britain was from the onset a 
primary destination for Shiites’ migration to Europe and has remained so. The 
bulk of the Shiᶜa is thought to have arrived from the early 1970s, with the Khojas’ 
expulsion from Uganda, followed by Iraqi, Iranian and Afghan migrants in the 
late 1970s.
4
 By then, the marjaᶜs Bāqer al-Sadr and Golpāyegāni had initiated The 
Muslim Arab Youth Organisation for Great Britain and Ireland (currently known 
as the Muslim Youth Association) and the World Islamic League or Islamic 
Universal Association (Majmaᶜ-e eslāmi-ye jahāni), which were established in 
1967 and 1974, respectively. Britain’s London heartland evolved into a 
microcosm of Shiism – although not always, necessarily, its European centre of 
gravity. The virtual absence of transnationally interlocking boards spanning Dutch 
and British Shiite organizations, for instance, provides a counterpoint (see van den 
Bos 2012b). London’s long shadow nevertheless shows institutionally through its 
hosting the primary foreign representations of marjaᶜs since the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and since somewhat longer, the late 1970s, the Twelver Khojas’ 
World Federation of KSIMC (Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities). 
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The Khoei Foundation, Imam Ali Foundation and Dar al-Islam Foundation, 
founded in, respectively, 1989, 1994 and 1993, have been among the primary for-
eign hubs of the late Abuᵓl-Qāsim al-Khuᵓi (d.1992), ᶜAli Sistāni and Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallāh (d.2011). In terms of population numbers, the estimates for 
Shiites in Britain have similarly been without European equivalent. The numbers 
and percentages provided have varied widely but are usually within the range of 
10 to 15 per cent of the total British Muslim population, implying 200,000 to 
300,000 persons by 2008 and 279,080 to 418,620 at the time of the 2011census.
5
 
France has not witnessed Shiite landmarks with a global stature equalling the 
mentioned British or German examples, but Shiite institutions with transnational 
appeal or acclaim have emerged there. Among these, in 1994, was Association al-
Ghadir in Montreuil, Paris, led until recently by Sadreddine, nephew of the late 
Lebanese Grand Āyatollāh Fadlallāh. Before that, a claim to Shiites’ European 
representation had surfaced from the Iranian Āyatollāh Dr. Mehdi Ruhāni 
(Rouhani, d.2000)
 
(Legrain 1986:8) who founded the Centre culturel et religieux 
chiite en Europe in the 1960s (cf. Camus 2004). While his brothers, the Grand 
Āyatollāhs Sādegh and Mohammad Ruhāni (d.1997), became causes célèbres for 
clerical dissidence in the Islamic Republic, his Parisian centre came under the 
influence of a Khomeinist tendency
 
(Legrain 1986:20). By 1984, a network of 
Shiite mosques had emerged throughout France whose founding imams would re-
appear among diplomatic personnel of the Iranian embassy (cf. Legrain 1986:21). 
Centre Zahra, situated around Dunkerque and founded in 2005,
6
 attained national 
notoriety through its association with the far right activist Alain Soral and the 
anti-Semitic comedian ‘Dieudonné’ (see Thiolay 2009; Camus 2007:74). Related 
institutions such as Fédération Chiite de France have similarly profiled 
themselves politically, systematically defending the regimes of Tehran and 
Damascus (Frégosi 2014:233). In sum, the French context is very different from 
the British, marked by ideological oppositions between Shiite organizations and 
the statal order at large. Its demographic profile captures a different order as well, 
with estimates from several thousand – which is certainly too low -, to 150,000.7 
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Germany shared the coincidence of a migration wave and resurging Shiite reli-
gious activity since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Böttcher 2007:213) with 
the United Kingdom. There has been a degree of commonality with the British 
situation since somewhat longer, furthermore, as regards the main ethnic-national 
profiles of Shiᶜa migrants from the Greater Middle East and those of their formal 
organizations, which have featured Iraqi, Iranian and to a lesser extent Afghan 
markers. The main ethnic-national constituents of Shiism in Germany are thought 
to consist of Iranians (some 120,000) and Afghans (some 80,000), besides smaller 
groups chiefly from Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon (Mohagheghi 2007:123). Britain’s 
imperial history shines through the large primary representation of South Asians, 
Pakistanis especially, among British Shiite organizations, but these were trailed by 
Iraqi and Iranian bodies, with ‘Afghan’ among a host of minor ethnic-national 
labels (see van den Bos 2012b:574). There are no apparent equivalents in either 
Germany or Britain, lastly, of starkly particularistic phenomena such as the 
Twelver Karanes in France, who relocated from politically unstable Madagascar 
to the Indian Ocean departments of Mayotte and Réunion (see Camus 2007:72). 
Two of the main Twelver centres in the Paris region, affiliated with the Khojas’ 
World Federation, counted in the majority as indo-réunionnaises (cf. 2007:73-4). 
The German setting contrasts the French and British ones especially in regard 
of the highly developed institutionalization of its Shiite organizational life. 
Whereas the mentioned French ‘Federation’ is one among several organizations 
pivoting especially on a single mercurial individual named Yahia Gouasmi (cf. 
Thiolay 2009) and national umbrella bodies in Britain have never bridged ethnic 
and generational divides simultaneously, the German IGS or Islamische Gemein-
schaft der schiitischen Gemeinden Deutschlands represented over a hundred 
‘(local) mosque communities’ (Moscheegemeinden) in 2009, the year of its 
establishment, while claiming in 2015 to represent ‘over 96%’ of all Shiite 
associations in Germany.8 While organizations under the IGS umbrella represent 
different ethnic-national, ideological and taqlid tendencies, moreover, it is striking 
that the IGS leadership thus far, has been Iranian, of the Islamic Republican kind. 
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Distinct country profiles surface when considering Shiites’ settlement in Europe. 
When exploring what happens structurally in encounters of Shiism and Europe, 
however, geographical borders often fade to the background. To the foreground 
come boundaries of a different kind: those involved in the establishment of Shiite 
identity and organization. Specifically, the paradox runs through many examples 
of a Shiism in Europe that often appears socially integrative while also revolving 
around religious retention. This is a duality representing a distinct possibility in 
Berry’s dispositions model of acculturation: ‘integration’ is the double affirmative 
on the two scales of cultural maintenance and societal relations (see 1997:9-10). 
Two other positions on cultural maintenance and societal relations which are 
often involved in discussions of integration - that where the first is devalued and 
the second are emphasized, and that, inversely, where the second are de-
emphasized and the first is valued - are ‘assimilation’ and ‘separation’ (see 
1997:9-10). Neither assimilation nor separation is currently a dominant professed 
orientation among key Shiite representatives in Europe. Assimilation might show, 
for instance, in the endorsement of secularism as an enabling condition for 
religious freedom. The foundational argument has been heard since the 1990s 
from religious intellectuals in Tehran (Jahanbegloo 2011:16-19), but seems almost 
beyond the pale, ironically, in European Shiism’s London microcosm. Speaking at 
the Shaheed Sadr Conference in Cricklewood in April 2009, Shelina Zahra 
Janmohamed exceptionally ventured that it was secularism which allowed for the 
construction of alternative visions, and that while secularism (culturally) was 
problematic for Muslims, it was particularly in secular settings that Islam 
nowadays thrived. Her comment served as a retort to another panellist who had 
remarked that the secular order of the West was taking away from the sacred, 
desacralizing what came into its touch, and negatively affecting the ability of 
Muslims to be religious persons. Active separation in the current era, as in the call 
on Muslims in the United Kingdom in November 2009 by Āyatollāh Khāmeneᵓi’s 
then representative in Britain, Āyatollāh ᶜAbdolhoseyn Moᶜezi to quit the British 
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armed forces  - service in Afghanistan or Iraq was ‘forbidden by Islam’ -  is 
similarly rare.
9
 The tendency has been associated particularly with an earlier day 
and age, in the 1970s and 1980s, when trans-sectarian societies such as Siddiqui’s 
London-founded Muslim Parliament (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins 2002) and the 
‘Kaplan Gemeinde’ in Cologne (see Schiffauer 2000) thrived on confrontational 
Islamic supremacism. Among Shiites in Europe, these registers have often faded. 
While the acculturation model provides a useful first orientation on integration, 
its definition is limited by mutuality in engagement and acceptance, the 
assumption of unambiguous values, and uncharted sub-forms (1997:10-11). The 
mentioned IGS, for instance, has been led since 2010 (Zentrum [...] n.d.) by 
Hojjatoleslām Khalilzāde, an advocate for Shiites’ societal integration.
10
 His IGS 
profile fails to mention, however, that he is also a member of the Tehran-based, 
Iranian state-led Majmaᶜ-e jahāni-ye ahl-e beyt organization (e.g., see "Taᵓsir-e 
goruhak-e daᶜesh" 1394/2016), whose main objective has been ‘to gain control 
over the political, social and religious affairs of the Shii communities throughout 
the world (and) to centralise them under the leadership of the Iranian walī-ye 
faqīh ᶜAlī Khāmeneᵓī’ (Buchta 2001:351; cf. van den Bos 2018). It may be more 
accurate, then, to conceive of integration in encounters of Shiism and Europe as 
forms of hierarchical rebalancing, more suitably assessed through the language of 
boundaries. Wimmer’s taxonomy of rudimentary boundary making distinguishes 
initially between ‘shifting,’ either contracting or expanding definitions of group 
membership, and ‘modifying’ the meaning of boundaries (2008:1037, 1044). The 
first kind associates more readily with the emphasis on rapprochement in Berry’s 
characterization, while Khalilzāde’s apparent entryism resonates with the second. 
Of the two main meta-positions on European Islam, one is deeply sceptical, 
underlining the failing integration of Muslims in Europe, often implying their 
separation (e.g., Tibi 1995 [1992]; Caldwell 2009:129-32, 108, 139), while the 
other emphasises integration and, especially, assimilation (e.g. Cesari 2003; Moss 
2008) – where conceived sociologically as an integration sub-type (e.g., Schunck 
2014:9) centred on increasing similarity (Brubaker 2001:534). As indicated 
above, the separation register has receded in the public discourse of Shiites in 
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Europe. Whereas the sceptics focus legitimately on religious retention, moreover, 
affirmative societal relations may steadily accompany cultural maintenance. 
Wimmer’s elaboration of boundary modification is instructive to further scratch 
the surface of such ‘integration-retention.’ Where changing an hierarchical order 
(‘transvaluation’) is not an option for a non-dominant group, it may attempt 
‘positional moves’ within (2008:1038). Such are seen, too, in several Shiite cases. 
Many Shiite organizations in Britain show an interest in relating with non-
Muslim others, evolving through a range of often ritualised exchanges. Among 
these are public iftars (e.g., by Gulf Cultural Club in Marylebone
11
 and The 
KSIMC of London in Stanmore); blood donation drives (initially via the Islamic 
Unity Society (IUS) of Birmingham, currently the apparently de-localized ‘Who 
is Husayn Campaign’); and ‘visit my mosque’ days (e.g., in the Hyderi Islamic 
Centre of Streatham, London and Masjid al-Husayn in Leicester). Other, 
ostensibly more secular examples of civic engagement are found, for instance, in 
Shiites’ outreach to non-Muslim audiences for lectures or celebrations by an array 
of religious organizations such as Noor Youth (Moss 2008:45); in the officers of 
the Khoei foundation who held ‘monthly meetings with the metropolitan police on 
police/youth interactions’ (Leichtman 2006:6); or the spectacular design of 
Salaam Centre in the service of a diverse local community in Harrow, North 
London for SICM, the Shia Ithnaᶜashari Community of Middlesex (Dwyer 2015).  
An assessment of these engagements cannot but realise, however, their state of 
exception – contrasting the parallel lives of Shiite summer camps (Akhtar 
2014:33), elementary schools (see, f.i. Bdaiwi 2010), youth or student clubs (e.g., 
the Ettehādiye), elderly forums (see 'London Jamaat and CoEJ - Part III'  2012:19-
21) and graveyards (e.g., Bagh-e-Zahra cemetery in Woking).
12
 The plans for 
Salaam Centre position Shiites collectively in society, involving challenging 
outreach, community consultations and planning permissions (e.g., Royston 
2010). Simultaneously, the Centre is aimed at integrating the outside world within 
its own religious universe, inverting the hierarchy of self-other relations. It 
envisions serving diverse local communities and functions (among which a sports 
facility and a nursery) but will not tolerate alcohol on the premises (Kirk 2007). 
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The second, assimilationist view holds later-generation Muslims in Europe 
subject to a global sociological transformation that sees their religious authority 
decentralised and religious practice or belief individualised. This portrays Europe 
as a hegemonic cultural transformer, in other words, which arguably fails, 
however, to adequately capture its encounter with Shiism. A different perspective 
surfaces when scrutinizing case credibility (cf. Tezcan 2003:257, questioning 
alleged individualisation in German Muslim case studies) and the containing 
variable hierarchy (where what meets the eye at lower levels of an organization 
may be encompassed at higher levels by its contrary (cf. Dumont (1966) 1980)). 
Among Moss’s showcases for youthful, individualising British Shiism, for 
instance, was Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission (AIM) (2008:44), which recast Imam 
Husayn away from the battlefield as ‘a symbol of love,’ but from whose website 
also emerges disciplined message mobilisation for the Islamic Republic and 
Khāmeneᵓi.
13
 Erricker described intergenerational tensions in Western Khoja 
circles, where ‘authoritarian’ parents did not connote ‘authoritative’ upbringing 
anymore, as part of a collective ‘spiritual emergency’ (2008:16-8). Their World 
Federation, meanwhile, has since 1976 presided over the global integration of 
regional Ithna-Asheri Khoja assemblies, retaining until today a leadership of 
mostly august elders and a collective orientation towards Āyatollāh Sistāni’s 
marjaᶜiyat.
14
 Individualisation in these examples is offset by and subsumed within 
larger structures of organization that show not later-generation assimilation but 
religious retention, albeit in contexts of integration, whether professed or factual. 
The salience of retention is equally a striking counterpoint to the subgenre of 
assimilation literature that deems local political context decisive to Islamic 
organization in Europe. This literature gives explanatory privilege to national 
institutions (e.g., ‘state-church regimes’ (Fetzer & Soper 2005)), societal 
conditions (such as the variant strength of populist parties (Koopmans et al. 
2012)), or supranational governance (see Parker 2005:2 on ‘the EU’ as ‘a causal 
factor’ for Islam’s continental integration). The crux of Khalilzāde’s above-
sketched case, however, leads one in another direction, to suggest that none of the 
mentioned variables are decisive to profound religious organization. Three cases 
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substantiate the point: the transnational branching of single societies, replications 
abroad of organizational templates and marjaᶜiyat recalibrations of societal order.  
The Europe chapter of the Twelver Khojas’ World Federation, the Council of 
European Jamaats (CoEJ), is in its turn the steering body for continental Khoja 
communities in individual countries and cities. It holds intervention rights to 
enforce conformity, irrespective of societal particularities.
15
 The Federation itself 
developed international relations beyond the confines of European Union interest, 
amplifying remnants of the Khojas’ proto-statal religious functions on a world 
scale. These have included the commitment to help their entire community in 
Yemen resettle in Djibouti;
16
 the provision of religious aid and resources from 
Europe (Kosovo (Lachaier 2007:116)) to Iran;
17
 and country offices functioning 
‘as de facto embassies negotiating directly with a host country for passports and 
visas for its members or political and economic dispensations’ (Akhtar 2014:33). 
Irrespective of the variation in socio-political contexts, one finds intensive 
transnational collaborations of Shiite organizations in Europe and replications of 
their operational templates. The Head of the Islamic Centre of England (Markaz-e 
eslāmi-ye Englis, or ICEL) represents Khāmeneᵓi in Britain (van den Bos 
2012a:66). The organization is organically connected with other British 
extensions of his marjaᶜiyat (in Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester and 
Newcastle)
18
 and in Europe. There are kindred centres in Stockholm, Vienna and 
Hamburg (Hesse-Lehmann & Spellman 2004:144): the English-named Imam Ali 
Islamic Centre, Islamisches Zentrum Imam Ali Wien (IZIA), and the Islamisches 
Zentrum Hamburg (IZH). Several of these Centres have rotating leaderships. For 
instance, Moᶜezi headed the Viennese Centre before taking the helm in London 
(cf. IP/07/670) between August 2006 and June 2014. In 2009, Dr Rezā Ramazāni 
left the IZIA to succeed Āyatollāh Seyyed ᶜAbbās Qāᵓem-Maqāmi 
(Ghaemmaghami) as leader of Hamburg’s IZH, which has ‘played an exceptional 
role as Iran’s ideological centre for the dissemination of Iranian-type Islamism 
among Muslims […] in Western Europe’ (Grünewald 1995). Moreover, the IZH 
and ICEL engaged occasionally in effective exchanges of experience, where 
‘[b]est practices are mutually adopted’ (Hesse-Lehmann & Spellman 2004:148). 
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In each country studied, lastly, whether ‘laicist’ or with an ‘established church’ 
regime among other models (cf. Joppke 2014:1324), key Shiite institutions retain 
strong marjaᶜiyat ties - for instance, Association al-Ghadir in Paris through a 
family extension of Āyatollāh Fadlallāh and Husayniyat al-Rasul al-Aᶜzam in 
Cricklewood, London, to members of the Shirāzi family.
19
 Such ties, whether 
‘formally emulative’ or ‘sentimentally affinitive,’ may authoritatively define 
friend and foe within sub-state communities and across national spheres. In other 
words, such bonds bring their own politics, as seen in Khāmeneᵓi’s heightened 
campaign since several years against local Shirāzis - rendered variously under 
‘British,’ ‘Londoner,’ or ‘MI6 Shiites’ (Azizi 2015) -, where simmering strife 
over tatbir ritual and religio-political authority, resonating from British to German 
environments,
20
 is overlain with the foreign geopolitics of Iran-West relations.
21
 
Whereas Salaam Centre was aimed only in the limited space of its self-funded 
private property at integrating the outside world within its religious universe, 
inverting the societal hierarchy of self-other relations, the three cases here testify 
to grander-scale practices of transvaluation, across and beyond sovereign national 
realms and European space. The ambivalent sub-type of ‘normative inversion’ 
(Wimmer 2008:1044) in the third case leads to the threshold of what can still 
count as ‘integration.’ While Khāmeneᵓi’s erstwhile representative in Germany, 
the Āyatollāh Qāᵓem-Maqāmi, has ruminated on mutuality and integrative 
‘European Islam’ (Ghaemmaghami 2010) and there is no explicit call to 
separation in the anti-Shirāzi polemic, that is, the latter also asks of Muslims, in 
the voice of a foreign state, to turn on co-religionists, whether citizens or not, and 




The lure for Shiites in Europe of Islamic ideologies devaluing external relations 
while emphasizing cultural maintenance has been associated with a particular 
historical moment, but important organizational representatives of ‘separation’ 
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remain. As in the discussion of ‘integration-retention,’ Berry’s acculturation 
quadrant provides an instructive first orientation on ‘separation’ (1997:9-10) but is 
less useful as a guide to account for its ambiguities and defining sub-forms, which 
come to the fore in practices of boundary modification (e.g., Wimmer 2008:1044). 
The case here explored is of a long-standing Twelver society with an often 
sectarian attitude to ideological purity, which has mostly shunned outside 
engagement in Europe, but whose religious identity was nevertheless molded 
through local interactions in Germany and Britain. The organization typifies the 
post-migration pattern of ‘separation-appropriation,’ in other words, which both 
resembles and contrasts ‘integration-retention’ in this puzzle of Shiism in Europe.  
The Union of Islamic Students Associations (In Europe) or Ettehādiye-ye 
anjomanhā-ye eslāmi-ye dāneshjuyān dar Orupā (from here: UISA or Ettehādiye) 
has modest local origins but now stretches from France to Ukraine and testifies to 
salient religio-political evolution. Before moving to West-Germany for study, the 
Ettehādiye initiators Mostafā Haqiqi and Asadollāh Khāledi had participated in 
the sessions of Sheikh Halabi (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:349), the founder of 
the ultraconservative Anti-Bahāᵓi Society in Iran. In Germany, the students added 
a robust political accent to this original orientation, surfacing, for instance, during 
a six-day hunger strike in front of a courtroom in Hanover, protesting Khomeini’s 
exile to Turkey in 1964 (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:98). The Ettehādiye held its 
first gathering in March 1966 in Giessen, in the federal state of Hesse (see UISA 
[...] 2008; cf. Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:48-9) and developed into ‘the loudest 
voice of the Islamic movement of Iran abroad’ (Beheshti, 1386/2007-2008:10ff.).  
The advancing Persian-language documentation of their movement, some of it 
cited above, does not signal orders from abroad and it appears that the seven 
founding students in Germany took the initiative for the Ettehādiye by themselves. 
An obvious clue in what distinguished the European UISA and its American 
parallel organization from Islamic Student Associations in Iran involved not pro-
clericalism or anti-Westernism but the fact that the former had been more overtly 
political ‘from their very inception’ (see Algar 1987:81). While Islamic student 
organization, whether or not it conceived of itself as political, was under state 
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pressure in Iran (1987:81), moreover, Iranian student organizers faced few 
obstacles in the West - despite their targeting of an allied regime. For the Iranian 
expatriates in the Ettehādiye, it was the liberal German state and society which 
provided their brand of Shiite political activism with, in terms of social movement 
theory, a conducive ‘political opportunity structure’ (e.g., cf. Wiktorowicz 2004). 
The students liaised with Khomeini and other Shiite activists such as Musā al-
Sadr, the Shiite cleric of Iranian descent in Lebanon, through Sādeq Tabātabāᵓi 
(d.2015). Tabātabāᵓi was Sadr’s first cousin and his mediation was further 
facilitated, one speculates, through descent from a highly respected religious 
family in Qom, in addition to the marriage of Khomeini’s son Ahmad to his sister 
Fāteme in 1969 ("Khānevāde […]" 1386/2008)  . The Ettehādiye’s relation with 
Khomeini, in other words, was ‘indigenous.’ Vital to their incorporation into the 
Khomeinist orbit, however, was the revolutionary cleric Mohammad Beheshti, 
since 1969 their ‘ideological advisor’ (moshāver-e ideᵓolozhik) (Bāqer-Nezhād 
1386/2007-8:43-4, 47-8, 63, 70), who urged the students to strive for a world 
Islamic order (see Beheshti 1386/2007-2008:16-17, 30). By 1970, the Ettehādiye 
had branched out beyond Germany, with chapters in Paris, Brussels, and London. 
During the 1978-9 revolution, the Ettehādiye turned up the level of its activism. 
After Khomeini’s entry into Paris in October 1978 they started publicity 
campaigns in over 25 European cities to expose the Shah’s regime through 
lectures and exhibitions about events in Iran, among which ‘Black Friday’ - the 
killing of dozens of anti-regime demonstrators on Tehran’s Jaleh (Zhāle) Square 
on 8 September 1978 (see Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:128). Numerous members 
of the London anjoman, reportedly, went back to Iran when the revolution 
unfolded (Kanoon Towhid ISA-London, Kanoon Towhid ISA-London 2008). 
Tabātabāᵓi, the Ettehādiye prominent from the German realm, accompanied 
Khomeini on his return to Tehran in February 1979 and was appointed as the 
spokesman of the provisional government (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:128). 
After the revolution, many ‘former members [of the European and American 
Unions] rose to positions of prominence in the Islamic Republic’ (Algar 1987:82). 
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After the revolution, the Ettehādiye remained in the public eye. For instance, 
they were involved in organizing the yearly Qods Day demonstrations in 
European cities,
22
 Berlin and London in particular. (These had been called by 
Khomeini in August 1979 to decry Zionism and non-Muslim rule over Palestine. 
French authorities banned the first Jerusalem Day in Paris, which had been 
initiated by anti-Israel groups to take place in 2008). By the same token, the 
Ettehādiye played a part in events in London in April 1980 surrounding the 
seizure of the Iranian embassy by Ahvazi separatists. Two of ‘the martyrs of 
Kanoon-e Towhid London,’ one of whom an affiliate of the London anjoman, had 
worked at the Embassy and were killed by the hostage-takers. A UISA flag 
covered the coffins of their repatriated bodies in Tehran (Nurafzā 2005).
23
 In 
1989, the Ettehādiye issued a statement declaring that all would be done to 
effectuate Khomeini’s fatvā against Salman Rushdie, which led to the deportation 
of UISA members from Britain.
24
 Their organizers in Germany, too, collaborated 
with Iran’s overseas operations, including those of the Mykonos affair in Berlin.
25
  
The firm regimist orientation of the Ettehādiye is reflected in the structure of 
their organization. The Islamic Republic affects the UISA most visibly through a 
‘Representative’ (nemāyande) dispatched from Iran. During Khomeini’s lifetime, 
Āyatollāh Mohiᵓeddin Fāzel-Harandi was appointed by the former’s deputy, Āya-
tollāh Hoseyn ᶜAli Montazeri, as ‘Representative for [the] Affairs of Iranian Stu-
dents Abroad’ (cf. Iran Almanac 2008) and as the Islamic Republic’s 
Representative in the Ettehādiye.
26
 The UISA, in turn, has a ‘Representative of the 
Union in Tehran’.
27
 After Khomeini’s demise, and reportedly, immediately after 
his assumption of office, Supreme Leader Khāmeneᵓi appointed a new 
Representative to the UISA, reflecting old ties: Beheshti’s son-in-law, Ho-
jjatoleslām Dr. Javād Ezheᵓi.
28
 Ezheᵓi remains the ‘Representative of the Leader in 
the Union’ (nemāyande-ye maqām-e rahbari dar ettehādiye) to the present day.
29
 
After the revolution, Iranian students came to Europe on state studentships that 
might be ended if they were deemed insufficiently deferential.
30
 The message that 
unconditional loyalty to the Islamic state was required for membership was 
reinforced in speeches by embassy personnel in the Ettehādiye. Iran’s ambassador 
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to France, for instance, Dr. ᶜAli Āhani, conveyed this message at the annual 
gathering in October 2006 of the French Islamic student associations.
31
 In Britain, 
the Iranian state purchased the so-called Hammersmith ‘Imāmbāra,’ after which, 
in 1984, it became known as ‘Kanoon Towhid’ - the Ettehādiye’s flagship 
building. Many of their additional British gathering places (e.g., in Cardiff, 
Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle) were also owned by the Islamic 
Republic.32 Thus, while the Ettehādiye was a vanguard of Shiite Islamism before 
the revolution, afterwards they related to the Islamic state as a Western extension.  
Despite the UISA’s championing of regimist orthodoxies, the evolution of the 
organization has been more complex than their dependencies suggest. An internal 
briefing shows that space had also emerged for the critique of the Islamic state. 
Divisions came to the fore from the mid-1990s, when the religious reform 
movement came up in Iran, over the Kanoon Towhid lectures of the reformist 
former regime ideologue ᶜAbdolkarim Sorush. In June 1996, the British branch 
stated their duty to ‘dissociate’ (tabarrā) themselves from Sorush - i.e., a practice 
usually reserved for the cursing of the enemies of the Ahl-e Beyt - in light of 
Khomeini’s call to ‘be a supporter of velāyat-e faqih so that harm will not come to 
our country’ (UISA-UK1375/1996). By then, however, Kanoon Towhid was a 
relatively liberal island in the organization, visited by key reformists such as the 
imminent president’s brother, Mohammad-Rezā.
33
 In the late 1990s, reformist 
students obtained President Khātami’s consent for a yearly salutation to the UISA, 
in an apparent attempt to countervail the Leader’s annual message.
34
 Reformists 
were at the helm of the Ettehādiye from 1999 until into the Ahmadinezhād era.35 
Kanoon Towhid’s vanguardist role was enabled by its longstanding relation 
with Sorush in preceding decades, and the latter’s encounter with Western 
thought, especially that of Popper and Popperians -  their epistemological as well 
as political writings (see Paya 2003:57). Sorush’s lectures in Kanoon Towhid 
were later published in Iran,36 feeding into the Shiite reformism of political Islam. 
A similar point applies to Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari in Hamburg, who 
was, like Beheshti before him, an ideological advisor of the Ettehādiye. A hard-
line modernist at first, who presented ‘Weststruckness’ as ‘a dangerous illness’ to 
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the Iranian Islamist students in Germany (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8 91, 211), he 
changed course by relating kalām to Western oeuvres such as Karl Rahner’s, 
undermining Islamic Republican political feqh (see Arjomand 2003). Mojtahed-
Shabestari’s reformist hermeneutics led him to reject the Islamist state in Iran and, 
by the 1990s, explicitly embrace liberal citizenship (Badamchi 2017:63-4; 74ff.). 
The London front of the Ettehādiye presaged the religious reform movement in 
Iran, which is reminiscent of the organization’s role in propagating political Islam 
before the revolution. The European setting in both cases provided the UISA with 
extraterritorial outposts: safe havens in which ideological-identitarian orientations 
could gather strength that would in a later phase enter the political centre stage in 
Iran. Within the organization proper, however, the ‘public declaration of the 
hidden transcript’ (Scott 1990:202-27) remained an act of insubordination within 
systemic bandwidth. The backlash to its critiques of despotic conduct, interviews 
with associates show, caused innere Emigration, but they do not indicate 
secession for counter-organization. This suggests, beyond downright repression, 
the remnants of legitimacy for the reformists of the Islamist state project in Iran. 
It remains to typify Shiite-European encounters in the evolution of the 
Ettehādiye. The organization’s reformist interlude represented a softening of 
‘separation’ - a relaxation of identitarian rigidity and a greater preparedness to 
engage with outsiders. These recalibrations, however, did not evolve into the 
integrative repertoires noted in other European organizations of Shiism - e.g., 
public iftars, blood donation drives, or outreach to non-Muslim audiences. The 
subordinate ‘appropriation’ process in the core of these recalibrations, however, 
would not be duly acknowledged either in the acculturation idiom of cultural self-
detachment. The ambiguity of ‘separation-appropriation’ does stabilise into a 
post-migration pattern when conceiving of the Ettehādiye as a hierarchy of values 
resulting from practices, internal as well as external, of boundary modification. 
The pre-revolutionary situation of the Ettehādiye was defined by its 
independent organization in liberal, lightly policed European states, which 
developed anti-Western, Shiite identitarian ideology. Its subsequent incorporation 
into the Islamic Republic changed the organization’s authority flow, now running 
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East-West, and imposed narrowed regimist boundaries on its Shiite identity. Its 
Leader-oriented hierarchical order, nonetheless, saw ‘normative inversion’ 
(Wimmer 2008:1044), inspired, in Europe, by varieties of Western thought, aiding 
to the critique of the Islamic Republic. Unlike the case of the anti-Shirāzi polemic 
that was projected onto an external world in order to transform it, however, the 




The last rudimentary part of this reflection is concerned with the hierarchizations 
that recur in all sketched cases of boundary modification. The threefold aim is to 
identify situations from which hierarchization springs, to explore its scaling along 
the two axes of differentiation and reciprocation, and within that framework, to 
generalise on socio-religious roles involved in the formation of European Shiism. 
At the outset is the observation that encounters of Shiism and Europe provoke 
questions of relative order, similar to those in Bowen’s case of Muslims’ marriage 
in French secular city halls. Maqāsid (‘purposes’) reasoning justifies it by 
scripture’s objective - ‘to make marriage a stable contract,’ in this example - but 
in so doing, defines the Republican space as Islamic (see 2010:155), inversing the 
overt value hierarchization of a Western state institution (cf. Joppke 2014:1330). 
Increasing or intensified religiosity has been theorised as a significant Muslim 
response to perceived exclusion in Western settings (e.g. Connor 2010:394; Voas 
& Fleischmann 2012:532), but for ‘reactive religiosity’ more generally to surface, 
Shiites’ relatively recent, and often overlapping minority status in Europe - 
ethnically, on the sectarian plane (facing Sunnism), relative to establishment 
religion (varieties of Christianity) and in regard of an encompassing secularism - 
is sufficient ground alone. In the face of such complex, encompassing alterity, 
Shiism’s challenge has often seemed to its adherents as one to remain integral (cf. 
Arfi 2010:237-38; Roy 2006:132-33 for ‘purity discourse’ in broader contexts of 
European-Islamic exchange), which has implied simultaneously, the necessity to 
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encompass ‘Europe’ (or Western identity more broadly) within its religious 
universe. In other words, the European migration context itself, or the mere idea 
of it, has often triggered heightened reflection in Shiism, on self-other relations.  
‘Hierarchy’ in the Dumontian tradition is an infamously intricate concept, 
applied variably, furthermore, in his own work (e.g., see Kolenda 1976). It is not 
to be taken as ‘social stratification,’ for instance (Dumont (1966) 1980:247-66), 
although vertical value differentiation is essential to it ((1966) 1980:241-44). 
Neither is hierarchy a contradiction of ‘reciprocity,’ whether in the Dumontian or 
wider structuralist anthropological understandings (e.g., see Lévi-Strauss 1944). 
Indeed, both reciprocity and ranking are involved in Dumont’s foundational idea 
of hierarchy as ‘the encompassing of the contrary’ ((1966) 1980:239ff.). Among 
contemporary applications of Dumontian thought (e.g., Haynes & Hickel 2016; 
Feuchtwang 2016), one teases out processual meanings of hierarchy beyond holist 
ideas of social order, as a generative principle ‘drawing in social matter’ (Rio & 
Smedal 2008). Building on the latter approach, hierarchy is recast additionally 
here as a scaled phenomenon, i.e. with differentiation and reciprocation as its 
tabular axes, allowing one to assess and compare hierarchization kind and degree. 
Readjusting the theoretical view on the vertical organization of self-other ideas 
to examine how hierarchization plays out socially, different elementary actor 
classes come into focus: starting with high religious authorities abroad, followed 
by their representative organizations in Europe, European spokesmen, the bulk of 
lay Shiite European organizations, and prominent Shiite individuals that 
participate in European public spheres in, especially, personal capacities. These 
are not cast-iron, self-contained categories, and overlaps are legion - e.g., in the 
case of Mohamed Walji, who has acted both as a Twitter opinionist, journalist for 
Press TV, and SICM board member. Most ‘players,’ moreover, cannot but relate 
in some way to the jurisprudential master discourse. Despite these caveats, 
however, each actor category associates with distinct registers, or register types. 
Among the most dedicated Shiite feqhi treatments of emigration (Darwish 
2014:84) are the well-known ones by Sistāni (al-Hakim 2001) and Fadlallāh 
(2004:191).
37
 Although quite distinct in their overall tenor, each reveal a view on 
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Western Muslims generally that tends to oppose the West to Islam, conceives of 
each on different levels of worth and regards their interaction as fraught with 
moral peril (e.g., see al-Hakim 2001:39). For this reason, no conception 
apparently emerges from their writings that sees transformations of Muslim 
identity in Europe as legitimate (cf. Darwish 2009:103-4, 128-9).
38
 Both, indeed, 
organise parts of their discourse around the key rubric of ‘loss of faith after the 
emigration’ (al-taᶜarrub baᶜd al-hijra), stated by Sistāni as a major sin (al-Hakim 
2001:40). ‘Faith’ in these juristic discourses is defined top-down and East-West, 
tied up importantly with taqlid (e.g., see al-Hakim 2001:49-50). Fadlallāh’s idea 
of engagement was to make Shiites’ citizenship conditional on their creation of 
so-called Islamic ‘incubators’ (muhādin), and on their involvement in local 




The hierocracy of Middle Eastern marjaᶜs itself incorporates representatives in 
Europe, on the other hand, who may play down hierocratic reach while emphasising 
Shiite settlers’ smooth local convergence or ideational room for manoeuvre. The 
differentiation of identities, in this case, associated with collective Shiite self and 
native European other, is muted or remains tacit, while social reciprocation 
becomes better conceivable. The cases of Qāᵓem-Maqāmi and Ramazāni were cited 
above, and it was equally striking in an interview with Israfil Demirtekin, a pivotal 
personality among Shiite organizations in the Netherlands, who claimed Dutch 
citizenship and Turkish descent and presented himself as a moqalled (‘emulator’) of 
Khāmeneᵓi’s. While he expounded on his adherence to unitary religio-political 
leadership in Shiism, Demirtekin also embraced his secular Dutch citizenship, 
paradoxically, with reference to marjaᶜiyat directives, stipulating respect for the 
laws of the land (i.e., a rule of Khāmeneᵓi’s consistent with Sistāni’s Code). ‘I am 
now living in Europe, in the Netherlands, and thus [….] my political and military 
leader is first the queen and then the prime minister.’ (Which order was that of the 
Dutch Constitution, before the reform of 1983). But which would be his position 
were these sovereignties to collide, where ‘Āyatollāh Khāmeneᵓi would say X and 
the Dutch government Y?’ Demirtekin retorted with hypotheticals of his own, 
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consistently leaving his stance open, i.e., bracketing hierarchization - while it is 
the moqalled (that is, a category of believer upon whom taqlid is incumbent), 
central to the conversation, whose voice is audible between the lines. In case of 
colliding sovereignties, there was an excluded path and an elementary choice: ‘I 
can’t stay here and [at the same time] follow X, because: I’ve signed something’- 
that is, pledged loyalty to the Dutch state. ‘If I wish to live here [I will be obliged 
to follow] Y, but if I want to listen to my marjaᶜ, then I have to emigrate […]’.
40
 
As the mentioned treatises diverge from substantive meanings of citizenship in 
Western contexts and ambivalence marks the statements of marjaᶜs’ spokesmen, it 
is perhaps not surprising to observe other accents in practical approaches to public 
engagement among many lay Shiite organisations in Europe. (It is not thereby 
implied, inter alia, that lay Shiite organizations would be opposed to the clergy - 
as emerges below). The cited phenomenon of blood donation, for instance, is 
anchored in different articulations of Shiite thought more amenable to a unitary 
view of humanity, as in the Nahj ol-Balāghe instructions letter 53 that famously 
speaks of others ‘like you in creation’ (Nahj […]: 231)  .
41
 The yearly Imam 
Hussain Blood Donation Campaign was first launched in 2006 by the Islamic 
Unity Society (IUS), an ethnically mixed although predominantly Arab 
organization catering for students and young professionals in Britain,
42
 and is 
currently associated, in particular, with the Europe-wide and transcending Who Is 
Hussain [sic] initiative. Promotional footage for the Unity Society’s 2007 drive 
(featured on its 2008 campaign site) hosted two prominent Shiite scholars, 
Āyatollāh Seyyed Fādhil al-Milāni and Seyyed Mahdi al-Modaressi giving reli-
gious backing for blood donation. Modaressi mentions Quran 5:32, containing the 
‘universalizing’ phrase (cf. M. Pregill in Azaiez et al. 2016:109), often invoked in 
claims to Islamic peacefulness, that ‘whoever saves one life, it is as if he had 
saved the whole of mankind.’ Milāni presents blood donation as isār - 
altruism/sacrifice. Asked for his opinion on giving blood to non-Muslims, he 
adds: ‘Nothing wrong [with] that, no’ (www.ius.org.uk/giveblood-CAMPAIGN).  
Compared with these words of religious authority, the emphasis has been more 
affirmative and societal in IUS statements. Haidar Abdali, representing the 2008 
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campaign, stated that ‘[l]ooking at the number of donations […] this year, giving 
blood is obviously a sentiment that is growing in the Muslim community. It is a 
generous act and is one positive stance towards community integration’.
43
 The 
IUS website mentioned in 2007 (and has subsequently) that ‘[t]he campaign 
strives to bring people from various ethnic groups together to give their valuable 
blood.’ The universalising, ethnic and faith group transcending context is made 
explicit in the next sentence: ‘Another reason that relates this act to […] Imam 
Hussain is that the members of his group came from every walk of life and the 
cause he died for served the whole of mankind’.
44
 The organization’s National 
Community Officer Dr. Marwan Al-Dawoud, lastly, voiced the hope that through 
blood donation, ‘members of the Muslim community will be more encouraged to 
contribute to British society and […] members of the British society will 
recognize the Muslim community’s efforts in taking active steps to participate’.
45
 
A last cohort of Shiite actors manifests itself in the public sphere on a mostly 
personal basis, while often attached to creedal leaders or institutions - as seen in 
the mentioned itinerant public speaker, scion of the Iraqi clerical family and 
founder of London-based Ahlulbayt TV, Mahdi Modarresi. They are a category 
only in the nominal sense, defined especially by their variation, although the place 
of Islam in the West often figures in their discourse. The sketched assimilationist 
and separationist positions at the Shaheed Sadr Conference testify to variations 
within the pattern. A third, integrationist position was taken by the community 
leader Muhammad al-Hilli, who remarked that he often came across Muslims 
who, when asked if they felt British, would exclaim, indignantly, ‘British? No, 
I’m Muslim!’ (Whereas there was nothing wrong, al-Hilli emphasised, with 
‘British-Muslim’). The bandwidth of such variation is limited by the fact that 
these Shiite actors often speak from settings of actual engagement, although sharp 
vertical differentiations and rejections of reciprocation exist here as well. The first 
show, for instance, in the fundamental censure of ‘the West’ by the Islamist 
ideologue Iqbal Siddiqui,
46
 while the second are seen in the central London 
mothers who sent their daughters to an Iranian primary school on the Islamic 
Republican model that oversaw the jashn-e ebādat ceremony – an invention of the 
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Islamist state, marking the requirement for nine-year-old girls to permanently don 
the hejāb (Spellman 2004:156). Asked ‘if they were concerned that their children 
were not interacting with non-Iranian and non-Muslim children […] [t]hey 
stressed the need to follow the Iranian state’s school curriculum’ (2004:157).  
The sketched scale of hierarchizations with corresponding socio-religious roles 
is one among several cases touched upon hitherto that show Shiite Islam ‘drawing 
in social matter.’ The dispersions of settlement, then, have their counterpoint in 
organizations of Shiism as an integrative tradition that itself is generative of social 
meanings and facts in Europe. Among the other cases are the post-migration 
patterns of integration-retention and separation-appropriation above and beyond 
settlement context. While suggestions of Shiite-European reciprocity and common 
cause recur among clerics’ spokesmen, their institutions may integrate organically 
across European lands for an at times divisive spiritual leadership, as when friend 
and foe are pinpointed among local believers and foreign geopolitics conditions 
their citizenship. Even while the terrain affected its religious framing and 
leadership struggles, the Ettehādiye ‘contained Europe’ within its trans-European 
authority flow. While this essay, as indicated, is limited in its focus on selected 
Iranian and Britain-based material, the cited resemblances elsewhere of its self-
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